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Abstract 
Rules are thought to persist to the extent that the direct benefits of having them (e.g. reduced 
transactions costs) exceed the costs of enforcement and of occasional misapplications. We argue 
that a second crucial role of rules is as screening mechanisms for identifying cooperative types. 
Thus we underestimate the social value of rules when we consider only their instrumental value 
in solving a particular problem. We demonstrate experimentally that costly rule-following can be 
used to screen for conditional cooperators. Subjects participate in a rule-following task in which 
they may incur costs to follow an arbitrary written rule in an individual choice setting. Without 
their knowledge, we sort them into groups according to their willingness to follow the rule. 
These groups then play repeated public goods or trust games. Rule-following groups sustain high 
public goods contributions over time, but in rule-breaking groups cooperation decays. Rule-
followers also reciprocate more in trust games. However, when individuals are not sorted by 
type, we observe no differences in the behavior of rule-followers and rule-breakers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Without this sacred regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct can be 
much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most essential difference 
between a man of principle and honor and a worthless fellow.  (Adam Smith, 
1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, §3.5.2) 
 
 Sometimes, by following rules in all their particulars, individuals and societies incur 
avoidable costs, as when proper application of legal procedure leads to criminals being released 
even though their guilt is not in doubt. Nevertheless, societies accept such costs on the grounds 
that the existence of a general system of rules is integral to social order. Rules and institutions 
provide consistency and reduce transactions costs (Sowell 1980; Hayek 1988), and in general 
rules develop and persist to the extent that the certainty and consistency they provide more than 
offsets the costs of creating them, including the costs of occasional misapplications (Demsetz 
1967). However, this argument need not imply that effective rules are always the product of 
deliberate design. Instead, extant rules may have emerged historically as a product of 
circumstance and persist because they provide advantages to those groups that employ them 
(Gintis et al. 2001; Henrich et al. 2010).1 In the case of cross-cultural prohibitions on theft and 
murder, the value of the rules is obvious, but research across the social sciences has also 
demonstrated an underlying utilitarian logic to many less obviously beneficial rules and 
institutions.2  
 We provide evidence that rules serve a second, complementary purpose beyond the 
practical wisdom they embody for the solution of social problems: the decision to follow a costly 
rule reveals information about an individual’s type. Specifically, people who follow rules, when 
                                                
1 As Hayek (1988) argues, “if we stopped doing everything for which we do not know the reason, or for which we 
cannot provide a justification (…) we would probably very soon be dead.”  
2 See e.g. Cheung (1968) on sharecropping, Kaplan and Hill (1985) and Gurven (2004) on food sharing norms in 
hunter-gatherer groups, Ellickson (1989) on 19th century whaling norms, Leeson (2010) on medieval dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and Iannaconne, Haight, and Rubin (2011) on the Oracle of Delphi and divination. 
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doing so is costly, reveal their propensity to (conditionally) cooperate. We design a two-stage 
laboratory experiment in which we first observe subjects’ private willingness to follow an 
arbitrary and costly rule. Then, unbeknownst to the subjects, we sort them into groups based on 
the extent of their adherence to the rule. Individuals then play a repeated social dilemma game 
with others who followed the rule to a similar degree. We find that groups composed of 
individuals who adhere to the rule in the first stage sustain cooperation in the second stage. 
Moreover, even when they are not matched with similar others, individuals who follow the rule 
are prone to conditional cooperation: their contributions to a public good are correlated with 
others’ in their group while those of rule-breakers are not. 
In one treatment, where the second stage consists of 10 periods of a four-person public 
goods game with voluntary contributions (Isaac and Walker 1988), individuals in rule-following 
groups begin by contributing an average of 57% of their endowment in period 1, and by period 
10, contributions slightly increase to an average of 64%. On the other hand, in rule-breaking 
groups, 1st period contributions are nearly identical to the rule-followers at 58%, but by period 
10, average contributions decline to 29%. We demonstrate the generalizability of this finding in 
an additional treatment where the second stage consists of a repeated trust game (Berg et al. 
1995). Here we find that rule-following groups exhibit more extensive reciprocity and provide 
20% greater returns on trust than rule-breakers. Furthermore, in additional public goods game 
treatments, we show that increases in cooperation result directly from our rule-based sorting 
mechanism rather than from individual differences in preferences alone: when individuals are not 
sorted by type, there is no correlation between rule-following tendency and contributions. 
Moreover, sorting significantly increases welfare relative to an unsorted baseline, as unsorted 
groups contribute only 42% of their endowment in period 10. Thus, we argue that the social 
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value of a rule may be underestimated when we consider only its instrumental value; in fact it is 
possible that even seemingly costly and arbitrary rules may persist simply because they allow 
others to screen for cooperators.3 
There is a clear role for screening mechanisms to promote cooperation in human social 
and economic relations, as it is well known that many potential mutually beneficial transactions 
are plagued by incentive problems. Nevertheless, many people are involved in organizations and 
groups that provide local public (club) goods, in-group risk sharing, and so on. To explain this 
tendency toward apparently incentive incompatible cooperation, the theory of kin selection 
demonstrates how, at least within kin groups, such cooperation may be sustained as a fitness 
maximizing strategy due to shared genetic material (Hamilton 1964).4 Among non-kin, such 
incentive problems become more difficult to solve. However, if groups of prospective 
cooperators are able to screen out non-cooperative individuals, their remaining members will be 
able to reap the gains from specialization and cooperation because they need not worry that 
others will exploit their efforts. Recently debate has reignited over the possible influence of 
group selection in human social evolution, hinging on the idea that human cooperation persists 
because groups of cooperators could win out in conflicts with groups of cheaters (e.g. Wilson 
2012). However, opponents argue that any pressures toward group selection would be 
counteracted because individuals still face incentives to cheat and free ride within the group; thus 
                                                
3 We also find that individuals in rule-following groups in the public goods treatments earn slightly more on average 
than those in rule-breaking groups and in unsorted groups. However, in our experiment it doesn’t make sense to 
compare the social cost of rule-following to the benefits for two reasons: 1) individuals are unable to make such 
calculations in the rule-following stage because they have no foreknowledge of the second stage, and 2) the relative 
costs and benefits are arbitrarily chosen by the experimenter. If, as we believe, our result is largely insensitive to the 
total stakes in the public goods, then it would be trivial to guarantee that the social benefit exceeds the social cost by 
simply raising the relative value of the public good task. In general, applying the logic of Demsetz (1967), we would 
expect that even if rules impose direct costs on their followers, they can persist as long as the screening value they 
provide exceeds this cost. 
4 The basic logic is that an agent’s willingness to incur costs to benefit others will be directly proportional to the 
extent to which the beneficiary shares genes with the benefactor. 
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a population of cooperators would be easily invaded. In the context of that debate, our argument 
implies that imposing costly rules could provide one way in which cooperative groups might use 
observable behavior to ensure that cheaters could not invade the group. 
This idea has precedent in the literature on the economics of religion. For example, 
religious strictures regarding the choice of food items and articles of clothing may act as 
screening mechanisms that allow members of religious groups to distinguish sincere prospective 
members from free riders (Iannaconne 1992). By imposing a cost on entrants, these groups are 
able to maintain a high level of public (or club) good provision for their current members. To test 
this hypothesis, Aimone et al. (2010) design a public goods experiment with endogenous group 
formation in which the cost of joining various groups differs, and they find that individuals who 
join groups with higher entry costs also contribute more to the public good. However, our 
experiment differs from theirs in that our subjects do not choose their own groups, and neither do 
they know that they are being sorted into groups based on their willingness to endure a cost. 
Hence, we eliminate the possibility that free riders undertake the cost strategically. 
Recent research has also demonstrated that experimental decisions can identify 
behavioral types (Burnham et al. 2000; McCabe et al. 2001; Houser et al. 2004; Kurzban and 
Houser 2005; Wilson et al. 2010), and this information can be used to sustain cooperation among 
a subset of experimental subjects. For example, Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) regroup subjects in 
public goods games according to their initial contributions and find that assortative matching 
supports cooperation over time. Similarly, Rigdon et al. (2007) show that endogenous sorting of 
cooperative types in a repeated trust game sustains cooperation among the positively sorted. In 
general, behavioral typing from experimental data relies on early-period decisions in the relevant 
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experiment to classify types, which may confound interpretation of the results.5 We also sort our 
subjects by type without their knowledge, but instead of identifying types based on early 
decisions in the repeated game, we use unrelated behavior to develop our classification. Subjects 
decide to what extent they will follow the rule in private, without knowledge of the behavior of 
others and without knowledge of the second stage of the experiment. We find that willingness to 
endure a cost while following a completely unrelated rule nevertheless predicts cooperation 
when groups are sorted by type; however, when individuals are randomly allocated to groups, 
rule-following does not predict contributions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. Sections 
3.1 and 3.2 report on the results for public goods and trust games. In section 3.3 some robustness 
tests for No Sorting treatments are presented. Section 3.4 discusses and section 3.5 provides 
some additional regressions on individual characteristics and rule following. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Experimental Design 
The experiment consists of two decision-making stages and a questionnaire. In stage 1, 
which we call the Rule Following stage (RF), subjects control a stick figure walking across the 
computer screen. Each subject makes 5 decisions concerning the amount of time they wait at a 
sequence of red traffic lights, each of which will turn green 5 seconds after their arrival. Figure 1 
shows the screen that the subjects see. 
                                                
5 One interesting exception is Rietz et al. (2011) who implement a surprise restart of the experiment after a one-shot 
game and use behavior in the first game to type subjects in a repeated version of the same game. 
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At the beginning of the RF stage, the stick figure is standing at the left border of the 
screen, and all traffic lights are red.6 Subjects initiate the RF stage by pressing the START 
button. At this moment, the stick figure starts walking towards the first traffic light. Upon 
reaching the first red light, the stick figure automatically stops. The light turns green 5 seconds 
after the stick figure stops; however, subjects are free to press a button labeled ‘WALK’ any time 
after the stick figure stops. When a subject presses ‘WALK’, the stick figure continues walking 
to the next red light before stopping again, and subjects must once again press ‘WALK’ to 
continue to the next light. Throughout the RF stage, the WALK button is shown in the middle of 
the screen. Subjects can press the WALK button at any time during the RF stage. However, it 
becomes functional only when the stick figure stops at a traffic light.  
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the Rule-Following Stage. 
 
Subjects receive an endowment of 8 Euro, and they are told that for each second they 
spend in the RF stage they will lose 0.08 Euro. It takes 4 seconds to walk between each traffic 
light, and 4 seconds from the final light to the finish. Therefore, all subjects lose around 2 Euro 
walking, and if a subject waits for green at all 5 traffic lights, she will lose an additional 2 Euro 
waiting. Thus the most a subject can earn in the RF stage is 6 Euro (if she spends no time waiting 
                                                
6 Before subjects start the task, they see a short cartoon in which the traffic lights blink from red to green. This 
ensures that subjects understand that the lights can turn green. 
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at traffic lights), and the most she can earn if she waits is 4 Euro (if she waits exactly 5 seconds 
at each light).7 In the instructions for the RF stage (see Appendix A) subjects are told: “The rule 
is to wait at each stop light until it turns green”. No other information, apart from the payment 
scheme and a general description of the walking procedure, is provided in the instructions.8 
The rule following task creates a situation, familiar to most subjects, in which they are 
asked to follow an arbitrary rule at some cost to themselves. Waiting at a stoplight when there 
are no other vehicles or individuals in sight is an example of seemingly ‘irrational’ obedience, in 
the sense that (barring the presence of traffic cameras) there is no cost to breaking the rule. In 
such circumstances, the usual justification for obeying traffic law—ensuring the safety of drivers 
and pedestrians—has no bite because there are no other drivers or pedestrians to protect or be 
protected from. Yet in our experience, it is quite common for people to stop and wait impatiently 
at traffic lights, even in the middle of the night. Why individuals are willing to incur these costs 
in service of a rule is an open question. One plausible interpretation is that rule following 
minimizes cognitive exertion; by following the rules of the road, people avoid investing effort in 
defining their own rules. However, we propose that the decision to follow costly rules is more 
psychologically and behaviorally revealing: those who incur costs in order to follow rules 
implicitly identify themselves as cooperators or ‘team players’. 
To test this hypothesis, there are two treatments in our experiment: the Public Goods 
treatment (PG) and the Trust Game treatment (TG). Stage 1 of both treatments is the Rule 
Following task as described above. In stage 2 of the PG treatment subjects play 10 periods of a 
repeated Public Goods game with a voluntary contributions mechanism in fixed groups of 4. In 
stage 2 of the TG treatment subjects play a repeated Trust game 6 times in fixed groups of 4. In 
                                                
7 We substituted earnings from this task for a formal show-up payment. 
8 If subjects asked what would happen if they pass through the red light, one of the experimenters explained that all 
information relevant to the experiment is given in the instructions. 
 8 
particular, each subject plays the game twice with each other subject in the group, once as a first 
mover and once as a second mover. The order is randomized, and subjects receive no identifying 
information about their partner. 
Before making decisions in the RF stage, subjects only receive instructions for that stage. 
In particular, they are aware that the experiment will consist of several stages, but they know 
neither what they will do in the next stage(s) nor the connection between the RF stage and 
consecutive stages.9 Unknown to the subjects, their decisions in the RF stage determine their 
group membership in the PG and TG stages. 
We employ an identical matching procedure in both treatments. First, we randomly 
divide subjects into groups of 8. Second, within each group of 8, we rank subjects according to 
the total time they spent waiting at traffic lights – at least 25 seconds for those subjects who 
waited for green at all traffic lights and close to 0 seconds for those who did not wait at any 
traffic light. Then, in each group of 8, we separate the top 4 subjects (Rule-Followers) and the 
bottom 4 subjects (Rule-Breakers) into two groups for stage 2. After we match subjects, there is 
no interaction between any groups of 4. Subjects are not informed about the matching procedure, 
and they are told only that they will now interact with a fixed group of three other participants 
(see Appendices B and C).10 
In the PG treatment each subject receives an endowment of 50 tokens at the beginning of 
each of the 10 periods (1 token = 1 Euro cent), and she must choose how to divide her tokens 
                                                
9 In particular, subjects see a label that reads “Part 1” at the top of the rule following instructions (see Appendix A). 
In dictator game experiments, knowledge of the existence of an unspecified second-stage has been shown to alter 
subjects’ behavior by making them more cooperative in expectation that their first-stage behavior may influence 
their second-stage reputation (Smith 2008). If subjects are concerned for their reputation and thus wait longer than 
they might in a treatment without an implicit ‘shadow of the future’ (or, similarly, with a double-blind protocol), this 
would dilute the information content of the rule-following task, thereby strengthening our results.  
10 Note that we did not deceive our subjects. None of the statements in the instructions are false or misleading. As 
we discuss in the conclusion, it is a separate, and also potentially interesting, question whether subjects’ behavior 
would change if they had knowledge of the sorting procedure, but our purpose was to discover whether isolated rule-
following behavior was sufficient to identify subjects as cooperators.  
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between a group account and a private account. In each period, each subject earns the sum of the 
amount placed in the private account plus the individual return from the group account, which is 
(0.5 * (sum of all contributions)).11 Thus, it is individually optimal to contribute nothing to the 
group account and Pareto optimal for all subjects to contribute their entire endowments. After 
each period, subjects learn their earnings in that period, the sum of group account contributions 
from all members of their group, and their total earnings through that period. To avoid end-game 
effects, subjects are informed only that they will participate in several periods of decision-
making. 
In each period of the TG treatment, we divide each group of 4 into pairs. During the 6 
periods, pairs are re-matched so that no pair ever interacts in two consecutive periods. Each 
subject participates 3 times in the role of first mover (blue person) and 3 times as a second mover 
(red person, see Appendix C). As in the public goods game, subjects are informed only that they 
will make several decisions, but they are aware that they will participate in both roles.12 
Each subject receives an endowment of 80 tokens in each period (1 token = 1 Euro cent). 
The first mover chooses to send any amount between 0 and 80 tokens, knowing that the amount 
sent will be multiplied by 3 and given to the second mover. The second mover then chooses to 
send back to the first mover any amount between 0 and the amount received. In each period the 
earnings of the first mover are (80 tokens – tokens sent to the second mover + tokens sent back 
from the second mover). The earnings of the second mover are (80 tokens + tokens received 
from the first mover – tokens sent back to the first mover). After each period subjects observe the 
                                                
11 In the instructions subjects are told that all tokens contributed to group account are doubled and then equally 
divided among the 4 members of their group. It is well known that contributions are increasing in the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR). We chose an MPCR of 0.5 because it is easy to explain and because it occupies a middle 
ground between the MPCRs of 0.3 and 0.75 reported in Isaac and Walker (1988).  
12 Burks et al. (2003) find that telling subjects that they will be playing both roles reduces both trust and reciprocity 
relative to a treatment in which they are unaware.  
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amounts sent, received and returned as well as their own total earnings up to and including that 
period. 
After stages 1 and 2 subjects answered the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, which was 
designed to measure the extent of subjects’ concern for certain fundamental moral issues 
(Graham et al. 2008; see Appendix D). Then subjects received cash equal to the sum of money 
earned in stages 1 and 2. The experiments were conducted at Maastricht University’s BEELab in 
May – June 2011 and February 2012. Overall 72 subjects participated in the PG treatment (18 
groups of 4) and 96 subjects participated in the TG treatment (24 groups of 4). As robustness 
checks which we will discuss in sections 3.3 and 4, we ran the following additional treatments: 
1) a PG treatment in which subjects first performed the rule-following task and then played the 
Public Goods game with 3 randomly chosen individuals (64 subjects, 16 groups of 4); 2) a 
reverse-PG treatment in which the Public Goods game was played first with random matching 
into groups of 4, followed by the Rule Following task and the questionnaire (48 subjects, 12 
groups of 4); 3) a no-rule-PG treatment in which the phrase “The rule is to wait at each stop light 
until it turns green” in the instructions for the RF stage was replaced by “5 seconds after the stick 
figure reaches a stop light, it will turn from red to green” (24 subjects, 6 groups of 4); 4) a no-
rule reverse-PG treatment combining (1) and (2) (24 subjects, 6 groups of 4); and 5) our first 
Trust Game session, which fell prey to a software error and was dropped. No other data were 
collected for this experiment either in the form of pilots or other sessions/treatments. All 
experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
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3. Results 
In this section we analyze the Public Goods and Trust Game treatments in sequence, and 
after describing the data and summarizing our results from each treatment separately, we discuss 
the findings from both second-stage treatments together, along with the data from the rule-
following task. In particular, we explore the relation between our data and previous findings 
from the experimental literature on cooperation, reciprocity, and behavioral typing in social 
dilemmas. We also perform two robustness checks on the rule-following task to confirm its 
predictive power and to identify the extent to which rule-following results from our explicit 
statement of the rule. We find no significant differences between experimental sessions, so we 
pool the data for analysis. 
 
3.1 Public Goods Treatment 
Table 1 displays average public goods contributions and waiting times for individuals in 
rule-following and rule-breaking groups. On average, rule-followers wait 7 seconds longer at the 
red lights and contribute 17% more of their endowment to the public good than rule-breakers.  
 
Table 1. Mean Public Goods Contributions and Waiting Time by Type 
 Public Goods 
Variables Rule-Followers Rule-Breakers 
 
Percent Contributed 
(All Periods) 
 
63.84 
(2.020) 
 
 
46.24 
(1.890) 
 
Percent Contributed 
(Periods 1-5) 
 
65.01 
(2.742) 
 
55.92 
(2.569) 
 
Percent Contributed 
(Periods 6-10) 
 
62.67 
(2.972) 
 
36.56 
(2.585) 
 
Waiting Time (Seconds) 27.19 
(0.090) 
 
20.39 
(0.438) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 2 displays time series of mean total contributions and associated standard errors in 
rule-following and rule-breaking groups. From the figure, it is clear that contributions decline 
over time only among rule-breakers, and we find statistical support in Table 2 which reports 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the hypothesis of equality of mean group-wise contributions by 
group type for each period.   
 
Figure 2. Time Series of Mean Group Public Good Contributions by Type 
 
 
 Table 2. Wilcoxon Tests of Mean Group Contribution, µ, by Period  
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Test Statistic (W9,9) 40 47 61.5 55.5 63 64 60 60.5 61 67 
p-value 0.53 0.30 0.035 0.100 0.026 0.021 0.047 0.042 0.039 0.011 
Bolded entries statistically significant with p-value < 0.05. One-sided tests. 
 
In 7 out of 10 periods, we reject the null hypothesis of equal mean contributions in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that rule-followers contribute more to the public good. Furthermore, 
comparing average group contributions over the first 5 periods and last 5 periods, additional 
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Wilcoxon tests indicate that mean group contribution is significantly higher in rule-following 
groups than in rule-breaking groups in both early periods (W9,9 = 61, p-value = 0.039, one-sided 
test) and late (W9,9 = 65, p-value = 0.017 , one-sided test).13 
3.2 Trust Game Treatment 
Figure 3 displays histograms of the amount sent by first movers of each type, and Figure 
4 plots the average amount returned by second movers to first movers as a percent of the amount 
sent, for both group types in 3 bins.14  
 
 
Figure 3. Histograms of Amount Sent in the TG treatment. 
 
                                                
13 As a robustness check, we estimate a panel regression where the dependent variable is mean group contribution to 
the public good, and the independent variables are a period trend, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
subject was in a rule-breaking group and a value of 0 otherwise, an interaction between rule-breaking and the period 
trend, and a constant term. We include random effects for each group to control for repeated measures, and we 
estimate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Estimation results are available in Appendix E, Table E1, column 
(1). A negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term between period and rule-breaking (βrule-breaker*period 
= -1.85, p-value < 0.01) supports the evidence in Figure 2 that contributions decline over time among rule-breakers, 
and an insignificant effect of period indicates that contributions do not decline among rule-followers. 
14 Appendix F contains an additional figure showing, for each observation, the amount received by second-movers 
and the corresponding amounts returned and kept by group type. 
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Note that there is little difference in the amount of trust between rule-followers and rule-
breakers. However, the percent returned is higher in the rule-following groups than in the rule-
breaking groups.  
 
Figure 4. Barplots of Percent Returned by Second Mover in the TG treatment, by Group Type. # 
of observations listed within each bar. 
 
 
When rule followers receive a high number of tokens (between 61 and 80), they return an 
average of 102% of the amount sent, so that first movers suffer no loss due to trust. Rule 
breakers receiving between 61 and 80 tokens, on the other hand, return only 77% percent of the 
amount sent. Furthermore, the return on trust among rule followers increases noticeably with the 
amount sent, but among rule breakers, the average percent returned plateaus at 77% when the 
amount sent exceeds 20 tokens. To support these observations, Table 3 lists the mean percent of 
subjects’ initial endowments sent to the responder, the mean percent return on trust (defined as 
100*(amount sent/amount returned) – 100), and mean waiting time, by group type. While the 
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return on trust is negative for subjects in both rule-breaking (-10.4%) and rule-following groups 
(-29.1%), it is substantially higher among rule-followers.  
 
Table 3. Percent of Endowment Sent, Return on Trust, and Waiting Time by Type 
 Trust Game 
Variables Rule-Followers Rule-Breakers 
 
Percent of Endowment Sent 
 
48.66 
(4.868) 
 
 
49.07 
(4.970) 
 
Percent Return on Trust -10.402 
(6.396) 
 
-29.073 
(6.017) 
 
Waiting Time (seconds) 27.50 
(0.598) 
 
17.94 
(1.341) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
This finding is supported by Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the null hypothesis of equal 
mean return on trust in rule-following and rule-breaking groups for each period (1-3), where the 
first period is defined as the first time a subject was in the role of first-mover, and observations 
are excluded where the first mover sent 0. In the first two periods, we reject the null hypothesis 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that mean return on trust is higher in rule-following groups 
(W43,42 = 752.5, p-value = 0.089 and W42,37 = 633.5, p-value = 0.071, one-sided tests); however 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis in the third period (W39,38 = 698.5, p-value = 0.331, one-
sided test).15 Pooling the data and taking the mean return on trust for each subject over all three 
periods, another Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis of equal mean returns (W48,47 = 950.5, 
p-value = 0.092, one-sided test).16 
                                                
15 The number of observations changes because we only consider cases where first movers sent a positive amount. 
16 This finding is also supported by linear panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the mean percent 
return on trust in group k in period t, and the independent variables include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if the group was composed of rule-breakers and 0 otherwise, a control for the amount sent, and a constant term. We 
include a random effects error structure by group to control for repeated measures and estimate heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. The results are reported in Appendix E, Table E2, columns 1-2. A negative and weakly 
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3.3 Robustness: The No Sorting Treatments 
One possible explanation for the observed difference between types is that identified rule-
followers are generally more likely to make decisions with reference to some rule or norm. In 
other words, people who follow an explicit rule in one situation are likely to follow implicit rules 
in others. The “role-rule” model of human social behavior argues that many decisions can be 
explained by assuming that people are trying to “play by the rules”, where the rules are 
determined by the individual’s perceived role in the interaction (Harré and Secord 1972). Thus, a 
rule-follower might make high contributions because she believes it is the appropriate behavior 
in a game with potential gains from cooperation.  
One implication of simple rule-governed choice is that observed choices should be less 
variable over time. This is implied, e.g., by the definition of a social norm (read: informal rule) in 
Elster (1989) as “either unconditional or, if conditional, not future-oriented.” In the extreme case, 
rule-governed contributions to a public good may be completely insensitive to the behavior of 
others. In the case of our sorting public goods treatment, the variability of rule-following group 
contributions is obviously less than that of rule-breaking groups since contributions do not 
decline over time. Figure 5, showing time series of individual contributions to the public good in 
each group of four in our sorting treatment, makes this point clear. Comparing the bottom and 
top halves of the figure, one can observe that rule-following groups are much more likely to 
contain individuals who never alter their contributions. 
                                                                                                                                                       
significant coefficient on rule-breaking supports our claim that rule-breakers reciprocate less than rule followers (p-
value = 0.084). A second regression including a period trend and an interaction between the period trend and the 
rule-breaking dummy yields a stronger negative coefficient on rule-breaking (p-value = 0.048); however, we also 
find a significant negative coefficient on the period trend indicating that returns decline over time among rule-
followers. This is consistent with Bohnet and Huck (2004) who find that in repeated trust games, with both stranger 
and fixed matching, returns on trust tend to decline over time.  
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Figure 5: Time Series of Individual Contributions to the Public Good, Rule-Breakers and Rule-
Followers 
 
While we cannot directly observe whether a subject chose in accordance with a perceived 
contribution rule (we did not collect data on subjects’ stated reasons for their contribution 
decisions), we are able to exploit our no-sorting treatments to explore the hypothesis of rule-
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governed contributions indirectly. If our rule-following task captures individuals whose behavior 
adheres to a rule without regard to the future, then the contributions of rule-breakers should 
systematically differ over time from those of rule-followers even in the absence of sorting. Thus, 
we also collected data on 16 groups of 4 in a Public Goods treatment without sorting and 18 
groups of 4 subjects each in a reverse Public Goods treatment in which the order of the two 
stages was reversed; that is, subjects first participated in a repeated public goods game in 
randomly assigned groups and then participated in the Rule Following task.  
Figure 6 shows mean group contribution by period for the No Sorting- and Reverse-PG 
treatments as well as for Rule-Followers and Rule-Breakers.  
 
Figure 6. Time Series of Mean Group Public Good Contributions by Treatment 
 
When subjects are matched randomly into groups, the well-known pattern of cooperative decay 
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60% of the endowment; whereas, in the PG treatment both rule-followers and rule-breakers 
average 58%. However, by period 10, reverse-PG mean contributions decline to 41% of the 
endowment and no sorting-PG contributions fall to 44%, while rule-followers contribute 64% 
and rule-breakers contribute 29%. A Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis of equal mean 
contributions in period 10 between rule-followers and the pooled no sorting-PG and reverse-PG 
groups in favor of the alternative that contributions are higher among rule-followers (W9,34 = 
262, p-value = 0.028, one-sided test), but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean 
contributions between rule-breakers and no sorting-PG and reverse-PG groups (W9,34 = 159, p-
value = 0.244, two-sided test).17 
 
Table 4: Regression Explaining PG Contributions, No-Sorting and Reverse Treatments 
 Individual Contribution 
Period -1.333*** 
 (0.327) 
  
Broke-Rule 2.912 
 (3.179) 
  
Period*Broke-Rule -0.129 
 (0.419) 
  
Constant 32.56*** 
 (2.599) 
  
R2 0.049 
N 1120 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05, ^ p-value < 0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Moreover, we find no significant relationship between individual rule-following and 
contributions to the public good. For the pooled no sorting and reverse-PG treatments, we 
estimate a panel regression of individual contributions on a dummy variable that indicates 
                                                
17 These results are unchanged if we perform separate tests for the No Sorting and Reverse-PG treatments. 
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whether the subject broke the rule, a period trend and an interaction term; we include random 
effects for each individual to control for repeated measures, and we cluster standard errors at the 
group level. The regression, reported in Table 4 reveals no significant relationship between 
individual rule-following and contributions, though the period trend is negative and significant. 
Therefore, we conclude that the sorting procedure in the PG treatment eliminates cooperative 
decay in Rule-Following groups. This suggests that norm driven behavior, to the extent that we 
observe it, is group-contingent; i.e. cooperation among rule-followers is conditional on the 
contributions of others.  
This interpretation is supported by mixed-effects regression analysis.18 Restricting our 
attention to the no sorting-PG and reverse-PG treatments, we regress individual contributions on 
a constant term, a period trend, a dummy indicating whether a subject broke the rule, the one-
period lagged average of others’ contributions to the public good, a reverse treatment dummy, 
and interactions between rule-breaking and period, rule-breaking and lagged others’ 
contributions, and rule-breaking and the reverse dummy. We include nested random effects for 
each subject-in-session to control for repeated measures and within group correlations, and we 
estimate the model using restricted maximum likelihood. Our estimates of conditionality of 
cooperation for rule-followers is contained in the coefficient on lagged others’ contributions, and 
for rule-breakers in the joint effect of that coefficient and its interaction with the rule-breaking 
dummy. A positive and significant estimated coefficient on lagged others’ contributions indicates 
that rule-followers contributions are conditional on those of others (p-value < 0.01). On the other 
hand, the estimated coefficient of the lagged others’ and rule-breaker interaction is negative and 
significant (p-value = 0.073), and a Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that these 
coefficients sum to 0 (χ2 = 1.48, p-value = 0.22). This suggests that rule-breakers contributions 
                                                
18 Regression output and code available upon request. 
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are not responsive to the contributions of others and thus that they are not conditional 
cooperators.  
Thus, we argue that being a rule-follower, in and of itself, is not sufficient to generate 
high contributions to the public good. Rule-following individuals, when matched with other 
individuals who follow rules, are able to endogenously generate and conform to norms of high 
contribution, but in the absence of other rule-followers, such norms do not emerge as rule-
followers respond to low contributions by others by decreasing their own. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
While cooperative deviations from Nash equilibrium play are well-documented in the 
literature on social dilemmas (See e.g. Andreoni 1995; Henrich et al. 2001; Houser and Kurzban 
2002), and the cognitive mechanisms underlying cooperation and reciprocity are being slowly 
revealed by neuroeconomics (McCabe et al. 2001; Kosfeld et al. 2005; Knoch et al. 2006), the 
absence of cooperative decay in public goods experiments has generally been observed in 
outlying cases or with the introduction of communication and/or punishment (Isaac and Walker 
1988; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Bochet et al. 2006; Kosfeld et al. 2009; Xiao and Houser 2011). 
Exceptions to this rule exist; for example, subjects can achieve sustained cooperation when they 
are sorted according to their contributions (Gunthorsdottir et al. 2007) or when they make 
binding, incremental, publicly observable contributions in real-time (Kurzban et al. 2001). 
Similarly, allowing individuals to form their own groups increases average contributions, but 
there is still a tendency for contributions to decline over time (Page et al. 2005). Yet by simply 
screening our subjects according to how much cost they will incur to follow an arbitrary rule, we 
are able, in our first treatment, to identify cooperative types whose contributions to the public 
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good never decline, and in our second treatment, to identify reciprocal types in a trust game. 
However, when individuals are not sorted according to their rule-following behavior, individual 
waiting time is uncorrelated with contributions, which suggests that we have not simply 
identified those individuals who are willing to incur costs to cooperate. Instead, our evidence 
suggests that rule-followers are conditional cooperators. 
Notably, excluding the No Rule treatments, 61% of subjects spend at least 25 seconds 
waiting (5 seconds per light) indicating that they obey the rule without exception, though it costs 
them at least €2. Furthermore, average waiting time is 22.2 seconds, and many subjects who 
break the rule while waiting at one or two of the five stoplights nevertheless follow the rule in 
general. Obedience to arbitrary rules in experimental environments is well-known in social 
psychology, even when following a rule consists of administering “painful” punishment to 
others, as in the famous Milgram experiment and numerous replications (Milgram 1963; 
Zimbardo 2007). The fact that many individuals in our “rule-breaking” groups were not 
themselves gross violators of the rule suggests that the “broken windows” effect (in which 
individuals who observe violations of a rule or social norm are more likely to violate the same 
norm) may be operating in our environment (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Keizer et al. 2008).  
Our results in the PG treatment are also consistent with evidence that individuals tend to 
conform to the (implicit or explicit) norms established by those whose actions they observe (Frey 
and Meier 2004; Bardsley and Sausgruber 2005; Alpizar et al. 2008; Bicchieri and Xiao 2009; 
Korth and Reiss 2011). High levels of contribution to the public good, which we initially observe 
in both the rule-following and rule-breaking groups, are gradually crowded out, but only among 
rule-breakers. This is also consistent with evidence that the presence of one or more free riders in 
a population largely composed of conditional and unconditional cooperators is sufficient to 
 23 
induce cooperative decay in a voluntary contributions public goods game (Fischbacher et al. 
2001; Kurzban and Houser 2005; Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007). However, our mechanism allows 
us to identify these types prior to observing their play in the public goods game, and it also 
predicts reciprocal play in trust games. 
 
3.5 Individual Differences in Rule-Following 
A final feature of our design allows us to explore the determinants of rule-following at an 
individual level. At the end of each session all subjects answered the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire designed to measure the strength of their respect for various moral values (Haidt 
and Joseph 2004; Graham et al. 2008). While the list is not necessarily exhaustive, the purpose is 
to measure moral intuitions about the following five values: 1) aversion to doing harm; 2) 
concerns for justice or fairness; 3) love of country, family, and the ingroup; 4) respect for 
authority; and 5) the desire for cleanliness and purity. Subjects answer 6 questions about each of 
these values using a Likert scale. We construct a score between 0 and 30 that represents the 
strength of their respect for each value. Table E4 in Appendix E summarizes the distribution of 
individual moral foundation scores pooled across treatments. As an additional control we also 
ran one No-Rule public goods session with 24 subjects and a No-Rule reverse-PG session with 
24 subjects in which subjects in the first stage were not told “the rule is to wait…” Appendix F 
contains a figure displaying histograms of waiting time by Rule/No-Rule treatment. We pool the 
data from all experimental sessions and explore whether any of the moral foundations predict the 
extent to which individuals follow the rule. 
Specifically, we report logistic regression analysis explaining the decision to break the 
rule in terms of subjects’ moral foundation scores with controls for demographic characteristics 
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and our various treatments. The dependent variable is a binomial variable called “Rule-Breaker” 
that takes a value of 1 if the subject waited less than 25 seconds and 0 otherwise, and the 
independent variables are subjects’ scores for each of the five moral values, age, gender, dummy 
variables for the reverse-PG and No-Rule treatments, an interaction dummy between No-Rule 
and reverse-PG, field of study dummies, a dummy for non-European subjects, and a constant 
term. In the reverse-PG treatment, we also control for subjects’ own mean contribution to the 
public good as well as the mean contribution of others in their group.19  
Table 5 reports the estimation results, which are unchanged if we exclude the No-Rule 
treatment. First, we note that subjects are substantially more likely to break the rule in the No-
Rule treatment than in the other treatments, which indicates that an explicitly stated verbal rule, 
with no strings attached, is sufficient to induce rule following.  Second, we find that female 
subjects are less likely to break the rule than their male counterparts, and that age has no 
noticeable effect on rule breaking.20 Only law students show a significant increase in the 
likelihood of breaking the rule. Other field-of-study dummies and the non-European dummy are 
insignificant. Surprisingly, none of the moral values scores are correlated with rule-following.21  
                                                
19 Most of our subjects are business majors, so the field of study dummies indicate differences from the average 
business major. Note that we do not include a dummy for the Trust Game treatment since all Public Goods and Trust 
Game subjects were unaware of the second stage when making their rule-following decisions.  
20 Women are also less likely to cross at red lights in observational studies of pedestrian behavior in Amman, Jordan 
and Tel-Aviv, Israel. (Hamed 2000; Rosenbloom 2009) In Amman, age is also negatively correlated with crossing, 
but because our sample consists of university students, our data may lack the variability necessary to identify an 
effect. On the other hand, age may matter less in a simulated environment because age no longer correlates with the 
ability to quickly cross the road. 
21 For the curious reader, Appendix E also reports re-estimations of the regressions in sections 3.1 – 3.2 including 
average moral value scores within each group as additional independent variables, reported in tables E1 and E2. We 
also report a third regression table E4 identifying the impact of the period trend and moral values on contributions in 
the reverse-PG treatment. As before we include random effects for each group and estimate heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. In public goods treatments, fairness positively and significantly impacts contributions. In the 
PG treatment (Table E1, col. 2), authority also increases contributions and purity has a negative and significant 
effect, but these effects are not observed in the no sorting-PG treatments (Table E3, col. 3). In the no sorting 
treatments, we also observe a positive and significant impact of ingroup; when we also include the data from the no-
rule reverse-PG treatment (Table E3, col. 4), only purity has a negative and marginally significant effect on 
contributions. In the trust games, we observe no significant effect of moral values on returns to trust (Table E2, col. 
3).  
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Table 5. Determinants of Rule-Breaking, Logistic Regression 
Independent Variable Rule-Breaker = {0,1} 
Reverse -0.545 
 (1.163) 
NoRule 2.074*** 
 (0.536) 
Reverse*NoRule 1.092 
 (1.230) 
Female -0.615* 
 (0.283) 
Age -0.0294 
 (0.0633) 
Harm -0.00638 
 (0.0373) 
Fairness 0.00427 
 (0.0405) 
Ingroup 0.0210 
 (0.0378) 
Purity 0.00627 
 (0.0324) 
Authority -0.0573 
 (0.0359) 
Economics 0.418 
 (0.317) 
Law 1.026+ 
 (0.580) 
Psych 0.147 
 (0.513) 
Other -0.151 
 (0.402) 
Non-European 0.0912 
 (0.397) 
Mean Contribution*Reverse 0.0401 
 (0.0277) 
Mean Others’ Contribution*Reverse 0.00660 
 (0.0132) 
Constant 0.684 
 (1.664) 
Log Likelihood -189.159 
N 328 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 
4. Conclusions 
We design an experiment that highlights the value of rules as screening mechanisms for 
identifying cooperative and reciprocal types. Subjects who follow costly rules are sorted, without 
their knowledge, into groups that participate in repeated social dilemma games. The groups 
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composed of rule-followers are far more cooperative than those containing rule-breakers. 
Follow-up treatments in which subjects are randomly assigned to groups indicate that 
cooperation by rule-followers is contingent on interacting with others of the same type.  
Job applications, military training, religious ordination, and gang initiation, to name just a 
few examples, all require that potential group members display a willingness to follow arbitrary 
rules and procedures. Our research indicates that one important function of such rules is to screen 
out non-cooperative individuals, and this fact suggests an important reason why rules, norms, 
and conventions may tend to outlive their other, more apparent, uses. If rules sometimes appear 
silly, outdated, or inefficient, their continued existence may be explained by their value as 
screening mechanisms.  
An important policy implication of our results is concerned with the “broken windows” 
hypothesis mentioned above (Keizer et al. 2008). Since rule-following individuals are more 
prone to cooperate, but only when they interact with other cooperators, encouraging rule 
following in one social domain might improve prospects for cooperation in other domains. The 
opposite is also true: rule breaking in one domain might degrade respect for rules and prospects 
for cooperation in general.  
One direction for future research will be to test whether costly rules can effectively 
screen for cooperators when individuals also observe the rule-following decisions of others 
and/or when they are aware that their decisions will impact their access to one or more groups. 
For example, when forming groups for the provision of public goods, if individuals believe that 
groups of rule-followers will be more cooperative, then some individuals may strategically 
follow rules to gain access to those groups. Their free-riding behavior would then likely reduce 
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the benefits of assortative matching. Similarly, it is important to determine whether rule 
following predicts cooperation when there is no cost to following the rule.  
Recent research also demonstrates that greater exposure to impersonal exchange 
(markets) and to large-scale institutions such as organized religion are both correlated with 
experimental measures of other-regarding and cooperative behavior (Henrich et al. 2010). 
Although our subject pool contains individuals from a large number of nations, the 
preponderance of subjects hail from European nations and were raised according to the rules and 
norms common to European culture(s). For this reason it will also be important to explore the 
applicability of our results to a subject pool from a broader range of cultural backgrounds. 
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[Appendices For Online Publication] 
Appendix A: Instructions for the Rule Following Task  
 
General information 
You are now participating in a decision making experiment. If you follow the instructions 
carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of the other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the 
experiment  
 
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not 
allowed to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then we 
will come to your seat and answer your questions. Any violation of this rule excludes you 
immediately from the experiment and all payments. The research organization METEOR has 
provided funds for conducting this experiment. 
 
Part I 
In Part I of this experiment, you control a stick figure that will walk across the screen.  
 
Once the experiment begins, you can start walking by clicking the “Start” button on the left of 
the screen. 
 
 Your stick figure will approach a series of stop lights and will stop to wait at each light. To 
make your stick figure walk again, click the “Walk” button in the middle of the screen.  
 
The rule is to wait at each stop light until it turns green. 
 
Your earnings in Part I are determined by the amount of time it takes your stick figure to walk 
across the screen. Specifically, you begin with an initial endowment of 8 Euro. Each second, 
this endowment will decrease by 0.08 Euro. 
 
This is the end of the instructions for Part I. If you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and an experimenter will answer them privately. Otherwise, please wait quietly for the 
experiment to begin. 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the Public Goods Game 
 
Part II 
This part of the experiment will consist of several decision making periods. In each period, you 
are given an endowment of 50 tokens.  Your task is to decide how to divide these tokens into 
either or both of two accounts: a private account and a group account.   
 
Each period you receive the sum of your earnings from your private account plus your 
earnings from the group account. 
 
There are 4 people, including yourself, participating in your group. You will be matched with the 
same people for all of Part II. 
 
Each token you place in the private account generates a cash return to you (and to you alone) of 
one cent (0.01 Euro).   
 
Tokens placed in the group account yield a different return.   
 
Every member of the group receives the same return for each token you place in the group 
account. Similarly, you receive a return for every token that the other members of the group 
place in the group account.   
 
Thus, your earnings in each decision period are the number of tokens you place in your private 
account, plus the return from all tokens you and the other members of the group place in the 
group account. 
 
Specifically, the total amount of tokens in the group account, that is, your group account tokens 
and the tokens placed in the group account by other members of the group, is doubled and then 
equally divided among 4 members of the group. 
 
Here are two examples to make this clear: 
 
(1) Suppose you place 0 tokens in the group account and the other members of your group place 
a total of 150 tokens in the group account. Your earnings from the group account would be (2 * 
150) / 4 = 75 cents.  Other members of the group would also receive 75 cents from the group 
account.   
 
(2) Suppose you place 45 tokens in the group account and the other members of your group 
place a total of 15 tokens in the group account.  The total group contribution is 60. 
 
Your earnings from the group account would be (2 * 60) / 4 = 30 cents.  Other members of the 
group would also receive 30 cents from the group account.   
 
Each period proceeds as follows: 
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First, decide on the number of tokens to place in the private and in the group accounts by 
entering numbers into the boxes labeled private and group. Your entries must sum to your token 
endowment which is always 50.   
 
While you make your decision, the 3 other members in your group will also divide their token 
endowments between the private and group accounts. 
 
Second, after everyone has made a decision, your earnings for that decision period are the sum of 
your earnings from the private and group accounts. 
 
As an example, suppose the total contribution to the group account at the end of the period was 
120.  Your contribution to the group account was 30, which means your contribution to the 
private account was 20.  You would earn 80 cents this period, 20 from private account and (2 * 
120) / 4 = 60 from the group account. 
 
While you are deciding how to allocate your tokens, everyone else in your group will be doing so 
as well.  When the period is over the computer will display your earnings for that period and 
your total earnings up to and including that period. 
 
This is the end of the instructions.  If you have any questions please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come by to answer them.   
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Appendix C: Instructions for the Trust Game 
 
Part II 
This part of the experiment will consist of several periods.  
 
In this part, there will be two types of people, Red and Blue.  You will be both a Red person and 
a Blue person depending on the period.   
 
Each period you will be randomly paired with a person of the other type. 
 
In this experiment you will interact with 3 other people in the room. 
 
Instructions for Blue People 
Each Blue person begins each period with 80 tokens.  A Blue person may choose to send some, 
all, or none of these tokens to a Red person he/she is paired with by typing the amount into a box 
in the center of the screen and then clicking “OK”.   
 
Any tokens that a Blue person sends to a Red person will be subtracted from the Blue person’s 
account, multiplied by 3 and transferred to the Red person.  Any tokens that a Blue person 
chooses not to send to the Red person remain the Blue person’s earnings. (Only Blue people will 
be able to send tokens and have them multiplied.) 
 
Instructions for Red People 
Each Red person enters a period with 80 tokens.   
 
After the Blue person makes a decision, the Red person will see how many tokens were sent 
from the Blue person.  
 
The amount sent by the Blue person will be multiplied by 3 and added to the Red person’s 
account.  Then the Red person decides to send some, all or none of these tokens to the Blue 
person by typing the amount into a box in the center of the screen and then clicking “OK”.  
(Only Red people will make this decision.) 
 
In each period, each Red person is paired with one Blue person for the entire period.  (One 
“period” consists of one Blue person deciding how many tokens to send to one Red person and 
that Red person deciding how many of the multiplied tokens to send to the paired Blue person.) 
 
Summary 
 
A Blue person’s earnings for a period are: 
Earnings =  Starting tokens  
minus Amount Sent to Red  
plus Amount Received from Red 
 
A Red person’s earnings for a period are: 
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Earnings =  Starting tokens  
plus Amount Received from Blue x 3 
minus Amount Sent to Blue 
 
At the end of the experiment the sum of your tokens from all periods will be converted to Euros 
at a rate of 100 tokens = 1 Euro and paid to you privately in cash, along with your earnings from 
Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
This is the end of the instructions.  If you have any questions please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come by to answer them.   
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Appendix D: Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following 
considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 
 
      [0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and 
wrong) 
         [1] = not very relevant 
            [2] = slightly relevant 
                [3] = somewhat relevant 
                   [4] = very relevant 
                      [5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge 
right and wrong) 
  
______Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
______Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
______Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
______Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
______Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
______Whether or not someone was good at math 
______Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
______Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
______Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
______Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
______Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
______Whether or not someone was cruel 
______Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
______Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
______Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
______Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of  
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Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
______Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
______When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
______I am proud of my country’s history. 
______Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
______People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
______It is better to do good than to do bad. 
______One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
______Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
______People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something 
wrong.   
______Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
______I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
______It can never be right to kill a human being. 
______ I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. 
______ It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
______ If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
______ Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
 
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (full version, July 2008) by Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian Nosek. 
For more information about Moral Foundations Theory and scoring this form, see: www.MoralFoundations.org 
 
  
 38 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire: 30-Item Full Version 
Item Key, July 2008 
 
--Below are the items that compose the MFQ30. Variable names are IN CAPS 
--Besides the 30 test items there are 2 “catch” items, MATH and GOOD 
--For more information about the theory, or to print out a version of this scale formatted for 
participants, or to learn about scoring this scale, please see: www.moralfoundations.org 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PART 1 ITEMS (responded to using the following response options: not at all relevant, not very 
relevant, slightly relevant, somewhat relevant, very relevant, extremely relevant) 
 
MATH - Whether or not someone was good at math [This item is not scored; it is included both 
to force people to use the bottom end of the scale, and to catch and cut participants who respond 
with last 3 response options] 
 
Harm: 
    EMOTIONALLY - Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
    WEAK - Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
    CRUEL - Whether or not someone was cruel 
 
Fairness: 
    TREATED - Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
    UNFAIRLY - Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
    RIGHTS - Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
Ingroup: 
LOVECOUNTRY - Whether someone’s action showed love for his or her country  
    BETRAY - Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
    LOYALTY - Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
 
Authority: 
    RESPECT - Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
    TRADITIONS - Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
    CHAOS - Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
 
Purity: 
    DECENCY - Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
    DISGUSTING - Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
    GOD - Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of  
 
PART 2 ITEMS (responded to using the following response options: strongly disagree, 
moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree) 
 
GOOD – It is better to do good than to do bad. [Not scored, included to force use of top of the 
scale, and to catch and cut people who respond with first 3 response options] 
 
Harm: 
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    COMPASSION - Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
    ANIMAL - One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
    KILL - It can never be right to kill a human being. 
 
Fairness: 
    FAIRLY - When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring 
that everyone is treated fairly. 
    JUSTICE – Justice is the most important requirement for a society.  
    RICH - I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. 
 
Ingroup: 
    HISTORY - I am proud of my country’s history. 
    FAMILY - People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done 
something wrong.   
    TEAM - It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
 
Authority: 
    KIDRESPECT - Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
    SEXROLES - Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
    SOLDIER - If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would 
obey anyway because that is my duty. 
 
Purity: 
    HARMLESSDG - People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
    UNNATURAL - I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
    CHASTITY - Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.  
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Appendix E: Additional Regression Tables 
 
Table E1. Mean Group Contributions to the Public Good 
 Contribution 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 32.27*** 
(2.680) 
 
-87.47** 
(31.30) 
Period -0.064 
(0.473) 
 
-0.064 
(0.480) 
 
Rule-Breaker 1.381 
(3.004) 
 
1.420 
(3.592) 
 
Period*Rule-Breaker -1.851** 
(0.619) 
 
-1.851** 
(0.627) 
 
Authority 
 
4.991** 
(1.563) 
 
Fairness 
 
4.206** 
(1.493) 
 
Ingroup 
 
-0.797 
(0.884) 
 
Purity 
 
-2.834** 
(1.060) 
 
Harm 
 
-0.178 
(1.607) 
 
R2 0.218 0.495 
N 180 180 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table E2. Mean Percent Return on Trust by Group 
 Return on Trust 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -55.05*** 
(13.35) 
 
-22.23^ 
(12.41) 
-114.5* 
(56.93) 
Rule-Breaker -21.495^ 
(12.43) 
 
-36.39* 
(18.37) 
-29.08 
(18.91) 
Amount Sent 
 
 
0.976*** 
(0.206) 
 
0.982*** 
(0.199) 
0.948*** 
(0.240) 
Period 
 
-16.53** 
(5.89) 
 
-16.49** 
(6.170) 
Period*Rule-Breaker 
 
7.45 
(6.89) 
 
7.45 
(7.158) 
Authority 
  
2.595 
(4.770) 
 
Fairness 
  
1.216 
(3.015) 
 
Ingroup 
  
-1.221 
(3.170) 
 
Purity 
  
-3.948 
(5.715) 
 
Harm 
  
4.844 
(3.214) 
 
R2 0.394 0.447 0.517 
N 72 72 72 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05, ^ p-value < 0.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table E3. Mean Group Contributions to the Public Good, No Sorting and Reverse Treatments 
 Mean Group Contributions 
 No Sorting and Reverse-PG 
All Treatments, 
No Rule Data Included 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 31.90** 35.59** -22.80 12.32 
 (12.06) (12.62) (32.00) (36.86) 
     
Period -1.392*** -2.063* -2.063* -1.313*** 
 (0.245) (0.915) (0.924) (0.221) 
     
 
Mean Waiting Time 0.125 -0.0501 -0.0186  
 (0.477) (0.519) (0.472)  
     
Period*Mean Waiting Time  0.0318 0.0318  
  (0.0464) (0.0468)  
     
Reverse -1.516 -1.516 -1.883 -3.426 
 (4.509) (4.518) (3.899) (3.224) 
     
Harm   -0.362 0.116 
   (1.000) (1.033) 
     
Purity   -0.793 -1.302^ 
   (0.833) (0.722) 
     
Authority   -0.118 0.699 
   (0.787) (0.799) 
     
Fairness   2.318* 0.339 
   (1.142) (1.514) 
     
Ingroup   1.780^ 1.187 
   (0.995) (1.004) 
     
R2 0.116 0.118 0.296 0.188 
N 280 280 280 340 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05, ^ p-value < 0.1.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Column 4 excludes the Waiting Time and interaction terms because the No-Rule treatment  
alters the interpretation of those variables. 
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Table E4. Average Moral Foundation Scores (out of 30) 
 Moral Foundation 
 Authority Fairness Harm Ingroup Purity 
      
Mean 
 
(Std. Deviation) 
 
16.08 
 
(4.73) 
 
21.16 
 
(4.11) 
20.68 
 
(4.66) 
17.06 
 
(4.13) 
13.82 
 
(5.11) 
 
Appendix F: Additional Figures 
 
 
Figure F1. Amount Received, Kept and Returned in the TG Treatment, by Group Type 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure F2. Histograms of Waiting Time in Seconds, Rule vs. No-Rule Treatments 
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